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Custody of children is the legally recognized right and duty to
control and supervise them. The person with custody can determine
where they will live, their standard of living, and the nature of their
training. He is responsible fOt: seeing that their health, training, and
care meet certain minimum standards; and to a degree he is respon-
sible for their behavior. If these minimum standards are not met, he
may be deprived of custody, and possibly even subjected to criminal
penalties. But custody usually is something that is highly prized, and
most judicial contests involving it are between competitors for child
awards.
This article is concerned with some of the more important phases
of custody law, with particular emphasis on the law of Kansas. A word
of warning is needed as to the influence of this law. The courts have
developed some practices in custody matters not consi~tent with ab-
stract rules declared in the statutes and appellate opinions. For
example, in contests between parents, children are awarded to the
mothers as against the fathers in a far larger percentage of cases than
can be justified under the formal law. Further, custody cases are so
steeped in emotion that the results are often hard to predict because
judges frequently give greater weight to human interest sidelights
than is expected under abstract rules of custody law.
I. PERSONS ENTITLED TO CUSTODY
No one, not even a parent has an absolute right to the custody of a
child under all circumstances. The state, through the courts, can take
custody away from one person and award it to another if the well-
being of the child makes it necessary.! In this sense, custody is always
a qualified right.
But in the ordinary, normal family, one or both parents have legal
custody of the children; and there is little possibility of this right being
·Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law.
1 "While the prima facie right to the custody of the child is in the parent, it is not an uncon-
ditional right." Pinney v. Sulzen, 91 Kan. 407, 412, 137 Pac. 987, 989 (1914).
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disturbed as long as the family remains as a unit. At common law, the
father had custody of the children when the family was living to-
gether harmoniously, and his custody rights remained when he and
the mother were separated.2 In Kansas, parents have always been held
to have equal custody rights in their children unless a specific court
order to the contrary is made.s The father has no common-law custody
priority in this state.4 If the parents are divorced or separated and con-
testing custody of their children, the well-being of the children will
control in determining which parent will be awarded custody by order
of the court.1I The court may order that custody be divided between
the parents, giving it to one parent for part of each year and to the
other for the remainder. Or, custody may be awarded to one parent,
with visitation rights granted to the other. If the parent with custody
then dies, the other parent will be awarded the child.6
The Kansas position on equal custody rights of the father and
mother is based on the Kansas Constitution, article 15, section 6, which
states: "The legislature shall provide for the protection of the rights
of women ... and shall also provide for their equal rights in the pos-
session of their children." In addition, the legislature has provided that
both parents are the natural guardians of the persons of their minor
children.7
Even though parents have equal custody rights, this does not justify
a husband separated from his wife in forcibly taking their child from
her.s Nor do equal custody rights entitle one parent to exclusive
custody.9
If a child is adopted, the adopting parents have the same custody
rights as natural parents before adoption.10 After adoption, natural
• State v. Stigall, 22 N. J. L. 286 (1849); In the matter of Thomas Hakewill, 12 C. B. 223
(1852); 1 SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 790 (6th ed., 1921).
"Moyer v. Moyer, 171 Kan. 495, 223 P.2d 711 (1951); Miller v. Morrison, 43 Kan. 446,23
Pac. 612 (1890); State v. Angel, 42 Kan. 216, 21 Pac. 1075 (1889); State v. Jones, 16 Kan.
608 (1876).
• Ibid.
"Prier v. Lancaster, 169 Kan 368, 219 P.2d 358 (1950).
"In re Hollinger, 90 Kan. 77, 79, 132 Pac. 1181, 1182 (1913): "The natural rights of the
father were not completely annulled by the order in the divorce proceeding awarding the
custody of the child to the mother; they were suspended for the time being, but they were
revived in full force by the mother's death."; May v. May, 162 Kan. 425, 176 P.2d 533 (1947).
• KAN. G. S. 1949, 59-1802.
• State v. Taylor, 138 Kan. 407, 26 P.2d 598 (1933).
"Ibid. But ct. State v. Angel, 42 Kan. 216, 21 Pac. 1075 (1889).
,oKAN. G. S. 1949,59-2103; Denton v. James, 107 Kan. 729, 193 Pac. 307 (1920).
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parents lose their custody rights and have no more rights in the child
than a stranger.ll
If a child is illegitimate, there is not much law in Kansas on the
custody rights of the parents. The guardianship statute apparently ap-
plies to the parents of illegitimate children ;12 and if such parents are
natural guardians, it would seem that they are entitled to custody.
There is authority in Kansas and other states that the mother of an
illegitimate child has the right to its custody if she is a fit person to
care for children.13 Some courts have also held that the father of an
illegitimate child has a parental right to its custody.14 If both parents
of an illegitimate child are fit to care for it, there are cases holding
that the mother has preferred rights to custody over the father.15
It is generally true that for someone other than a parent to obtain
custody, a court order or decree is necessary. And when a parent once
loses custody, he can reobtain it only by judicial action. However, there
appears to be a minor qualification to this rule. Apparently in Kansas,
children's aid societies can secure custody of children by agreement
with those who have custody.10
Custody contests rather frequently develop between one or both
parents and other persons, usually grandparents, aunts, or uncles. In
such cases, the parents are preferred if they are fit persons to care for
their children.17 This tendency seems to be stronger in recent years
11 KAN. G. S. 1949, 59-2103; Morrison v. Chamberlain, 119 Kan. 803, 241 Pac. 115 (1925):
Whittaker v. Coffman, 112 Kan. 594, 211 Pac. 1116 (1923), rehearing denied 112 Kan. 597,
212 Pac. 912 (1923).
"Id. 59-1802: Johnson v. Best, 156 Kan. 668, 135 P.2d 896 (1943).
,. Johnson v. Best, supra note 12; Wood v. Lee, 123 Kan. 669, 256 Pac. 797 (1927); Applica-
tion of the New York Assn. for Jewish Children, 182 Misc. 651, 654, 44 N.Y.S. 2d 879, 880
(1943): "A natural parent in preference to all others is entitled to the custody of her child,
in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary... :'; Pratt v. Nitz, 48 Iowa 33
(1878): Ware v. Muench, 232 Mo. App. 41, 89 S.W.2d 707 (1935): In the Matter of Mabel
Nofsinger, 25 Mo. App. 116 (1887); Hesselman v. Haas, 71 N.J. Eq. 689, 64 Atl. 165
(1906); Commonwealth v. Bush, 152 Pa. Super. 580, 33 A.2d 57 (1943): Binion v. Mathis,
171 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1943).
U French v. Catholic Community League, 69 Ohio App. 442, 44 N.E.2d 113 (1942): "When
the father of such a child [illegitimate child] publicly acknowledges its paternity, and con-
tinuously contributes to its support and welfare, and is a proper person, he is next in law
entitled to its custody, when the mother relinquishes or abandons its control.": People v.
Spear, 174 Misc. 178,20 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1940): Pote's Appeal, 106 Pa. 574 (1884); Temple-
ton v. Walker, 179 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1944).
'8 Pratt v. Nitz, 48 Iowa 33 (1878), evidence existed that both parents were unfit but the
child was awarded to the mother; Wright v. Wright, 2 Mass. 190 (1806): In re Byron, 83
Vt. 108, 74 Atl. 488 (1909).
'8 KAN. G. S. 1949, 38-305, 306.
11 Parent preferred over grandparent: Ramey v. Ramey, 170 Kan. 1, 223 P.2d 695 (1950);
Stout v. Stout, 166 Kan. 459, 201 P.2d 637 (1949) Baliey v. Bailey, 164 Kan. 653, 192
P.2d 190 (1948); Jones v. Jones, 155 Kan. 213, 124 P.2d 457 (1942); Ex parte Windell, 152
Kan. 776, 107 P.2d 708 (1940); Andrews v. Landon, 134 Kan. 641, 7 P.2d 91 (1932);
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than in the years immediately after the often-cited Kansas decision of
ChapskY v. WoodIS in which the court awarded a child to its aunt
rather than its father, even though a strong case had been made out for
the father. Parents have this preference merely from the relationship
of parent and child. There is a presumption that a parent is fit to take
custody, if there is no evidence submitted to the contrary.I9 If the par-
ent is a fit person to have custody, it is immaterial that the other per-
son claiming custody is also fit and has been giving the child proper
and suitable care,20 or can offer the child greater comforts, wider edu-
cation, and the promise of a larger inheritance.21
When a child is awarded to one parent alone, it is not uncommon
for the child to be left much of the time with its grandparents while
the parent works. This does not amount to a custody award to the
grandparents. In the Kansas case of Dodd v. Dodd/2 a child was
awarded to the father from September to May, following divorce of
the parents. The custody order read: "... during the months in which
plaintiff [the father] has custody of said child, said child shall remain
with and be in the home of his paternal grandparents...." The mother
appealed this order on the grounds that in effect this was an award to
the grandparents and thereby violated her parental preference to the
Hollis v. Brownell, 129 Kan. 818, 284 Pac. 388 (1930); Melroy v. Keiser, 123 Kan. 513,
255 Pac. 978 (1927); Entzminger v. Hess, 110 Kan. 312, 203 Pac. 734 (1922); Jendell v.
Dupree, 108 Kan. 460, 195 Pac. 861 (1921); Crews v. Sheldon, 106 Kan. 438, 186 Pac. 498
(1920); In re Meyer, 103 Kan. 671, 175 Pac. 975 (1918); In re Zeigler, 103 Kan. 901, 176
Pac. 974 (1918); In re Underwood, 103 Kan. 505, 175 Pac. 380 (1918); Purdy v. Ernst, 93
Kan. 157, 143 Pac. 429 (1914); Wood v. Shaw, 92 Kan. 70,139 Pac. 1165 (1914); Swarens
v. Swarens, 78 Kan. 682, 97 Pac. 968 (1908); In re King, 66 Kan. 695, 72 Pac. 263 (1903).
Grandparent preferred over parent: Hayn v. Hayn, 162 Kan. 189, 175 P.2d 127 (1946);
In re Snook, 54 Kan. 219, 38 Pac. 272 (1894). Parent preferred over aunt or uncle: Monroe
v. Slaughter, 171 Kan. 614, 237 P.2d 372 (1951), after the aunt and uncle had cared for
the child for eleven years; In re Jackson, 164 Kan. 391, 190 P.2d 426 (1948); Loucka v.
State Department of Social Welfare, 163 Kan. 1, 179 P.2d. 791 (1947); May v. May, 162
Kan. 425, 176 P.2d 533 (1947); McGrath v. Vail, 140 Kan. 312, 37 P.2d 3 (1934); Smith
v. Scheuerman, 133 Kan. 348, 299 Pac. 616 (1931); In re Kailer, 123 Kan. 229, 255 Pac.
41 (1927); Pinney v. Sulzen, 91 Kan. 407, 137 Pac. 987 (1914). Aunt preferred over par-
ent: Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881). Parent preferred over non-relatives: Tucker v.
Finnigan, 139 Kan. 496, 32 P.2d 211 (1934); Wood v. Lee, 123 Kan. 669, 256 Pac. 797
(1927); In re Brown, 98 Kan. 663, 159 Pac. 405 (1916); In re Hollinger, 90 Kan. 77, 132
Pac. 1181 (1913); In re Carter, 77 Kan. 765, 93 Pac. 584 (1908), an illegal adoption. Non-
relative preferred over parent: Hodson v. Shaw, 128 Kan. 787, 280 Pac. 761 (1929), even
though an attempted adoption by the persons awarded ~ustody held to be void; In re Guber,
105 Kan. 515, 184 Pac. 850 (1919); In re Hickey, 85 Kan. 556, 11'8 Pac. 56 (1911). Older
brother preferred over father: In re Beckwith, 43 Kan. 159, 23 Pac. 164 (1890). Stepmother
preferred over father: State v. Taylor, 125 Kan. 594, 264 Pac. 1069 (1928).
18 26 Kan. 650 (1881).
1ll In re Jackson, 164 Kan. 391, 400, 190 P.2d 426 (1948).
'" Stout v. Stout, 166 Kan. 459, 201 P.2d 637 (1949).
III Wood v. Lee, 123 Kan. 669, 256 Pac. 797 (1927); Jendell v. Dupree, 108 Kan. 460, 195
Pac. 861 (1921); Swarens v. Swarens, 78 Kan. 682, 97 Pac. 968 (1908).
""171 Kan. 46, 229 P.2d 761 (1951).
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child's custody. In ruling against the mother, the Kansas Supreme
Court said:
We have never held that a father whose home has been broken up and who is
otherwise entitled to custody of his child can be deprived of that custody simply
because the exigencies of making a living compel him to keep it in the home of
h· 23IS parents..••
A child's next of kin are preferred over non-relatives in a custody
award if the next of kin are fit. In Paronto fJ. Armstrong,24 a child's
parents both died when he was about three years of age. Habeas corpus
proceedings were then promptly started in the Supreme Court of
Kansas by the child's grandparents against a couple whom the mother
had employed to care for the child. This couple had refused to give up
the boy to his grandparents. The court awarded him to the grand-
ents, saying:
... it is now well settled that under the common law, guardianship by nature of
the person of children was vested in the father and in the event of his death in
the mother, and in the event of the death of both parents in the next of kin.
[Citations omitted.] In this state by our constitution, article 15, section 6, and
by our statute, G. S. 1945 Supp. 59-1802, the rights of the father and mother
are made equal. We have no statute which denies common-law rights of guar-
dianship to the next of kin when both parents are deceased. Under G. S. 1935,
77-109, the rule of the common law as applied to next of kin remains in force
in this state, unless we should say it is not suitable to the conditions and wants
of our people. We would not be justified in so holding where, as here, the next
of kin are able and willing to assume the care of the child and promptly took
appropriate steps to do SO.25
An institution or children's aid society may be awarded custody of
children who are dependent, neglected, or delinquent.26 Such children
may also be awarded to private persons, even non-relatives.21• In fact,
whenever it is necessary for the well-being of a child, he may be
awarded to private persons who are not his relatives.28 . .
The doctrine. of parens patriae is sometimes invoked by courts to
justify the state's action in custody cases. This is ,mold equity concept
by which the state exercises its sovereign power of guardianship over
23ld. at 49.
.. 161 Kan. 720, 171 P.2d 299 (1946).
2Illd. at 725; accord, In re Bullen, 28 Kan. 781 (1882), in which the court ordered a child
sent to its grandmother in England rather than remain in an institution for children in Kan-
sas•
.. KAN. G. S. 1949, 38-303, 305, 306, 407, 409.
21ld. at 38-407.
.. Hodson v. Shaw, 128 Kan. 787, 280 Pac. 761 (1929); State v. Taylor. 125 Kan. 594, 264
Pac. 1069 (1928); In re Hickey, 85 Kan. 556, 118 Pac. 56 (1911).
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persons under disability, including children.29 When children are not
properly being cared for by their parents or if children become delin-
quent, the state, through its courts, may use its parens patriae powers
and make custody changes.3o The same doctrine has been used to re-
quire school attendance, restrict child labor, and prevent the public
sale of religious tracts by minors.31
II. STANDARDS USED BY COURTS IN AWARDING CUSTODY
There are three common standards used by courts in custody award
cases. These are that the welfare and well-being of the child are the
paramount consideration; parents, if fit, have a preference over others
in securing custody; and only a fit person may be awarded custody.
There is a close correlation between the first and third standards.
It will not contribute to the well-being of a child to award his custody
to one who is unfit.
There is a basic inconsistency between the first and second stan-
dards. Even if a parent is fit, it frequently would be better for the well-
being of the child to award him to someone other than a parent. A
grandparent, foster parent or adopting parent could often do more for
the child financially and otherwise than could the parents in those
cases in which custody is litigated.32 But whether they could or not,
the parent is given custody, if fit.33
An effort has been made in some Kansas cases to resolve this in-
consistency. This is done by saying that giving custody to a fit parent
is better for the well-being of the child than giving custody to anyone
else.34 The reasoning behind this argument seems to be that fit parents
:» In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115, 145 Pac. 871 (1915) .
.. The doctrine is referred to by name in the following Kansas custody cases: Moloney v.
Moloney, 167 Kan. 444, 206 P.2d 1076 (1949); White v. White 160 Kan. 32, 159 P.2d 461
(1945); Wear v. Wear, 130 Kan. 205, 224, 285 Pac. 606 (1930); Kailer v. Kailer, 123 Kan.
229,255 Pac. 41 (1927); Harmon v. Harmon, 111 Kan. 786, 794, 208 Pac. 647 (1922); In
re Turner, 94 Kan. 115, 145 Pac. 871 (1915).
n Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 u.s. 158 (1943) .
.. This idea is developed in Note, Custody of Children: Best Interests of Child vs. Rights of
Parents, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 306 (1945).
as See note 17 Supra.
&< "In the argument much is said about the welfare of the child. While that is a question
which always enters into cases of this character, it is the settled policy of this state that,
unless parents are unfit, the welfare of the child is always best conserved by its being in
their custody." Tucker v. Finnegan, 139 Kan. 496, 499, 32 P.2d 211, 212 (1934-).
"Casuists could make a good argument that, in the legendary case of the old woman who
lived in a shoe, who had so many children she did not know what to do, the welfare and
best int~rest~ ?f. those children would be to rescue them from the scant regimen and
Solomomc discipline of the worthy dame who had brought them into the world and to
place them in homes of well-to-do, kindly foster parents; but so long as the old w~man did
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will, through their affection and devotion, do more for their children
than can anyone else.35 In a recent California case, the court denies
that this is always true.36 The court then says that California has re-
solved the inconsistency between the welfare of the child standard
and the parental preference standard by holding that where there is a
conflict the parental preference standard controls if the parent is fit. In
the language of the court:
California has, in effect, adopted the harsh rule that the right of a fit and proper
parent to have the custody of his child is somewhat in the nature of a property
right and paramount to the welfare and best interests of the child.37
This realistic statement of the California rule is equally applicable
to the Kansas law.
Although they talk in terms of parental rights, what the courts may
have in mind in these cases of parental preference is that the well-
being of parents also should be considered in custody matters. And if
a parent is a fit person, his well-being in the form of emotional bene-
fits from close association with his child should be advanced even
though the child would probably benefit more by being awarded to
someone else.3S This argument is a valid one. Close family ties are
needed by adults as well as children.
her duty by her numerous progeny according to her ability, no court would have the right
to displace her as their natural and lawful custodian.
"Putting the matter in another way, it is quite correct to say that the welfare of children
is always a matter of paramount concern, but the policy of the state proceeds on the theory
that their welfare can best be attained by leaving them in the custody of their parents and
seeing to it that the parents' right thereto is not infringed upon or denied." In rt: Kailer, 123
Kan. 229, 231, 255 Pac. 41, 42 (1927).
as "Ordinarily the love of a parent is more advantageous to the child than any creature com-
forts or other advantages that a stranger may offer." In re Zeigler, 103 Kan. 901, 903, 176
Pac. 974, 975 (1918). Child awarded to its father.
"h has repeatedly been held that the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration.
In determining that welfare, however, regard must be had to a mother's affection; devotion
and care in all the trying vicissitudes ·of the life of a child.... Mother love and care may fa~
outweigh financial JI\eans and prospects."· Buchanan v. Buchanan, 93 Kan. 613, 616, 144
Pac. 840, 841 (1914). Child awarded to its mother. .
"There remains only the welfare of the child to be considered. The· court knows of no better
cusr.odian for a little girl than her mother, when the mother is of high character, well
situated to take care of her, has proved her ability to rear a daughter, and bears for her
children the full measure of a mother's love. The search for someone to stand 'in loco
parentis' is very brief when a capable, worthy, and affectionate mother, who has done
nothing to impair her right, pleads for the privilege in respect to the child she bore. The
better financial resources of the respondents cannot be allowed to turn the scale. Children
born in mangers and in the humblest log cabins have been known to do well." In re Carter,
77 Kan. 765, 766, 93 Pac. 584 (1908). Child awarded to its mother.
.. Shea v. Shea, 100 Cal. App. 2d 60, 223 P.2d 32 (1950).
87 Id. at 34.
as This idea is never clearly developed in the Kansas cases, but it is hinted at in these cases:
Loucka v. State Dept. of Social Welfare, 163 Kan. 1, 179 P.2d 791 (1947); Woodall v.
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Another explanation of the parental preference rule in custody
cases is that the state has limited authority over custody, and when a
parent is fit, the state has no right to interfere with a parent's custody.89
When a court does not like the result of the parental preference
rule because it does not adequately advance the child's welfare, the
fitness requirement can usually be applied with strictness so as to justify
an award to someone other than the parent. The fitness standard per-
mits of considerable discretion even by trial courts so as to eliminate
much of the harshness from the parental preference rule.
There have been many cases in which the Kansas Supreme Court
has ruled on what constitutes fitness to have custody of a child. Fitness
requires that a person have financial resources available to care for a
child's needs, the ability and willingness to provide a proper home,
interest in and affection for the child, and a character and personality
that will have a favorable influence on a child. Fitness standards are
the same for parents and non-parents, although in applying them,
courts sometimes seem to be more lenient in holding that parents are
fit.
A person may be financially qualified to have custody of a child
even though someone else who wants custody is financially much
better off.40 Questions of financial unfitness arise less frequently today
because of the aid to dependent children assistance programs.
The ability and willingness to provide a proper home for a child
involves more than financial means. It also requires that a stable home
Alexander, 107 Kan. 632, 193 Pac. 185 (1920), a visitation right case; In re Guber, lOS
Kan. SIS, 184 Pac. 850 (1919).
It may be that the' tendency of courts to prefer mothers over fathers in custody contests
between parents is due in part to similar reasoning, namely, that it is the mothers who ordi-
narily are most in need of close association with their children.
,.. ";~: ;'the' rule of law is' absolute that what is ,the best interest ,of a child is its parent's ex-
.. clusive 'concern-iult a' matter for judicial arbitrament--except where the parent is an unfit
'" ~ pet:sO'cl"'to have ~iich'custody." Smith v. Scheuerman, 133 Kan. 348, 351, 299 pac., ,616, ,618
"'(1931), in which custody was awarded to the mother. 'The same'reasoning is used in Whit-
taker v. Coffman, 112 Kan. 597, 212 Pac. 912 (1923); ,
<·Supra notes 34 and '35; Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881); c/. Hedding v. Inman, 172
Kan. 567, 241 P.2d 479 (1952). Contra, In re Bullen, 28 Kan. 781 (1882), in which the
court ordered that a child be sent to her grandmother in England, where she would receive
a legacy, rather than remain in a Kansas institution and not qualify for the legacy. In the
Bullen case the court justified its ruling in part as follows: "Second. There is a pecuniary
consideration. I am not so sordid as to believe that money is the one thing to be regarded;
but other things being equal, that certainly is a matter to be considered. 1£ she remains here
she will come to maturity without means, and dependent solely on her own labor or the
help of others. There she will have a little property-not a great wealth, it is true, but
enough to keep want away and to enable her to act freely in her choice of place and work
in life. There is also a possibility, though perhaps only a remote one, of her becoming through
the death of others the heir to quite a property." Id. at 788. See Roll v. Roll, 143 Kan 704,
56 P.2d 61 (1936).
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be provided and that a woman be available in the home to care for
the children. In Paronto v. Armstrong, one reason that the Kansas
court took an orphaned child away from a married couple was that
they were "unstable as to their home, no one knows where they are
likely to be in a few months or a few years," and "unstable in their
domestic relations," the husband having been married twice before,
the wife once, and they had failed to make a home for the children of
their previous marriages.41 When a man, usually a father who is di-
vorced, widowed, or separated, seeks custody of a child, the courts
ordinarily require that he have a woman in his home who can care
for the child: a second wife, sister, mother, or housekeeper.42 And the
woman may not qualify if too old or physically handicapped. In Cook
v. McCabe,43 custody of a three-year-old girl was taken from her well-
to-do foster father because the only women in his home were his eighty-
seven year-old mother, and his fifty-year-old, deaf sister with whom he
did not get along. The requirement of a woman in the home capable
of caring for the child is especally strong in cases involving very young
children or girls.
A fit person to have child custody must be one who has an interest
in the child and affection for it. If a parent in the past has abandoned
the child or left it in the care of others and shown no interest in its
welfare, this is strong evidence against later awarding custody to the
parent. Where a mother left her infant daughter with grandparents
for three years and did not visit the child or inquire about her during
this period, the mother was later refused custody.44 The Oklahoma
court refused custody to a young Indian father when the child's mother
was dead and the child had been reared by its grandparents. The
father had shown no concern in the child until the Bureau of Indian
. "161 Kan. 720, .731, 171 p.2d 299 (1946); accord: Lancey v. Shelley, 232 Iowa 178,2 N.W.
. 2d .781 (1942), father denied. custody when he and second wife were living in separate
residences and there was evidence that the second wife was contemplating a divorce; Dietrich
v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 43 A.2d 186 (1945), father denied custody when he proposed
to establish a home near a Memphis air base where he was stationed, his mother to leave
her husband on long visits to stay with the child in Memphis.
"In re Zeigler, 103 Kan. 901, 176 Pac. 974 (1918); In re Meyer, 103 Kan. 671, 175 Pac. 975
(1918); Pinney v. Sulzen, 91 Kan. 407, 137 Pac. 987 (1914); In re Hamilton, 66 Kan. 754,
71 Pac. 817 (1903) .
•s 108 Kan. 172, 194 Pac. 633 (1921).
"In re Snook, 54 Kan. 219, 38 Pac. 272 (1894). But c/. Swarens v. Swarens, 78 Kan. 682, 97
Pac. 968 (1908). In Edwards v. Session, 48 So.2d 771 (Ala. 1950), a mother was given
custody of her three-year-old child even though the mother had left the child at her sister-
in-Iaw's restaurant one evening promising to return in a short time, and did not return
for two weeks. The court felt that petitioner showed indications of becoming a good mother
and there was evidence that she had real love and affection for the child.
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Affairs threatened to discontinue his allotment unless he devoted more
attention to his child.45 And a Pennsylvania court took custody from
a mother who gave an undue amount of time to religious work for
Jehovah's Witnesses, leaving the care of her children to others.46 But
leaving a child with grandparents for a time while the father was else-
where earning a living has been held not to be abandonment justifying
removal of custody from the father.47
A good reputation and past record of good moral behavior, while
not always required, are helpful in securing a custody award.48
If parents have a bad reputation or record, this is often not decisive
if it appears that there has been a change for the better. The Kansas
court has awarded custody to a mother who had been committed to
the Kansas Industrial Farm for Women;4D a mother who a year earlier
was "inclined to drink and swear and keep late hours with men, some
of whom were married";50 and a mother found to have committed
adultery.51 In all of these cases there was evidence that the parents who
were given custody had ceased their previous undesirable behavior.
A court will not award custody to anyone, parent or not, who pres-
ently has habits which would have an adverse effect on children. A
woman living a secluded life, who is uncleanly, and uses vile language
was deprived of custody by the Kansas court.52 A father who "is some-
what intemperate in his habits, and often uses vulgar and profane
language in his family" was denied custody of his thirteen-year-old
.r. Ex parte Yahola, 180 Okla. 637, 71 P.2d 968 (1937).
··Derr v. Derr, 148 Pa. Super. 511, 25 A.2d 769 (1942), art. denied, 317 U.S. 631 (1942).
"Bierce v. Hanson, 171 Kan. 422,233 P.2d 520 (1951).
··Pinney v. Sulzen, 91 Kan. 407, 415, 137 Pac. 987, 990 (1914): "It has been satisfactorily
. shown that the petitioner is sober, industrious, and in good repute in the neighborhood where
he resides. The evidence of 25 of his neighbors has been produced, and they testify that he
is a man 0'£ good character and habits and a fit person to have the custody of his daughter..
The district' jU,dge, county attorney, collector of customs, clergymen, doctors, mechanics, and
officers' and ,members of fraternal lodges to which he belongs all speak well of his character
and habits. The manager of the company for which petitioner has been working says that
he has known the petitioner for about 20 years, and during that time he has borne a good
reputation.... Upon the testimony and all the circumstances in the case we are unable
to say, under the governing rules of law, that the petitioner is unfit and should be deprived
of the custody and guardianship of his child."; In re Jackson, 164 Kan. 391, 190 P.2d 426
(1948). A mother with a bad reputation for chastity was denied custody in Brown v. Brown,
71 Kan. 868, 81 Pac. 199 (1905) .
•• Loucka v. State Dep. of Social Welfare, 163 Kan. 1, 179 P.2d 791 (1947).
110 Smith v. Scheuerman, 133 Kan. 348, 299 Pac. 616 (1931).
61 Harmon v. Harmon, 1I I Kan. 786, 208 Pac. 647 (1922); Commonwealth v. Martocello,
148 Pa. Super. 562, 25 A.2d 855 (1942). Btlt ct. Bunim v. Bunim, 298 N. Y. 391, 83 N.E.
2d 848 (1949), noted in 24 NOTRE DAME LAW. 597 (1949).
"Foundling Hospital v. Harrington, 113 Kan. 521, 215 Pac. 303 (1923).
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son.58 A father charged with statutory rape was deprived of his adopted
daughter's custody, but when the prosecution was dismissed, custody
was ordered restored.54
The New York Court of Appeals has refused custody to a mother
who failed to show complete cure from narcotics addiction.55 But when
a mother's gambling habits were not known to the child, a New York
court refused to take custody from her saying:
A person may have a vice which may be mild or serious, but that vice may be
confined to the knowledge of that person and not known to anyone else, and
to adjudge this petitioner unfit to take care of the child, the court must find as
a matter of fact that the child has been harmed by her conduct or that the child
knows of her conduct and that knowledge of her conduct would be harmful to
the child and detrimental to its natural and normal growth and development.5G
Religious beliefs of a person seeking custody and the program of
religious training for a child have been held by the Kansas Supreme
Court to have no bearing on who is entitled to custody. In Denton tJ.
lames,57 a contest developed between a natural grandparent and parent
by adoption as to whether or not the child should be brought up as a
Roman Catholic. The court said that this matter was in the control of
the parent by adoption, and religious views of the parties should not
be considered in determining the right to custody. But a New York
court has denied custody to a father who was a Nazi.58
There is a close relation between fitness of a person to have custody
and the welfare of the child whose custody is in issue. The welfare of
a child requires that it be awarded to a person who is fit. A person is
fit who can provide the conditions which will contribute to the wel-
. .fare of the child. The two standards are frequently treated by the law
as two sides of the same coin, with the courts sometimes talking in
terms of fitness, sometimes in terms of the child's welfare, sometimes
both.
When talking. in terms of the child's welfare, courts require that
custody be awarded to one who will provide food, clothing, a home,
""In re Beckwith, 43 Kan. 159, 23 Pac. 164 (1890). Contra, Jendell v. Dupree, 108 Kan. 460,
195 Pac. 861 (1921), in which the court said: "... if an occasional outburst of temper
and the use of coarse or offensive speech were treated as sufficient grounds for depriving
parents of the custody of their children, many families might be disrupted." Id at 464.
MEntzminger v. Hess, 110 Kan. 312, 203 Pac. 734 (1922) .
.. Darlington v. Cobb, 135 Misc. 668, 239 N.Y. Supp. 301 (1930).
GO Oraf v. Oraf, 47 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1944).
157 107 Kan. 729, 193 Pac. 307 (1920).
58 The father "has been contaminated with the germ of Nazism which makes him totally unfit
to rear and guide the destiny of any living thing, far less an impressionable and susceptible
child of tender years:' Reimann v. Reimann, 39 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1942).
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moral guidance, affection-environment that will be conducive to the
healthy physical, mental, and moral development of the child. Stress
is on the needs of the child rather than on the capacities of the person
who wants custody.
In custody contests in which mothers of very young children are
trying to secure custody, it is common for courts to decide that the
welfare of these children necessitates maternal care. The Kansas Su-
preme Court has held that children thirteen, twelve, and five years of
age should be awarded to the mother instead of the father because:
"They are of an age that they need maternal care, and of course, the
appellant [father] is away from home during the day while at work.,,59
But in another case the same court awarded an eight-year-old boy to
his father rather than his mother saying:
If a child is of tender age, almost of necessity it must be entrusted to its mother's
care, without weighing unduly what may be some possible shortcomings in her
character or conduct, and notwithstanding the divorced father may be a man of
superior character and attainments.... As a child grows out of babyhood or its
early minority it may and frequently does happen that its welfare will be better
served by changing its custody from an indifferent mother to a more consider-
ate father. We think the present case is a good instance of this sort.60
The physical and mental health of children influence custody deci-
sions. When an award will adversely affect a child's health, that award
will not be made.61 A mother has been refused custody of her twelve-
year-old son because she continued to live with the boy's stepfather who
had severely beaten the child on numerous occasions.62 The Kansas
courts have permitted a mother to have custody and move with her
children to California because associations with their father had been
•• Lamer. v. Lamer. 170 Kan. 579.585.228 P.2d 718, 721 (1951); accord: Heddin$ v. Inman.
In Kan. 567, 241 P.2d 479 (1952), mother awarded an eight·year-old girl. the court con-
cluding that when both parents arc fit, a mother's love which no one else can give a child.
tips the scales in favor of the mother; Prier v. Lancaster, 169 Kan. 368, 219 P.2d 358 (1950),
four-year-old son, awardee;!, to the mother- against the :father, but- -the court ,said - that the
following statement of the law made by the lower court was too broad: "..• unless a
mother is an unfit' person to have -",stedy of a child of tender years. she should have it,
unless she is not adequately able to care for it."; In r~ Bart, 25 Kan. 308, 311 (1881), chil-
dren four and five years of age awarded to their grandmother with whom their mother lived:
"They are of that tender age when they need a mother's care. No stranger, however kind,
can fill her place."; see Bierce v. Hanson, 171 Kan. 422.233 P.2d 520 (1951). BI/t se~ Maple
v. Maple. 29 Wash. 2d 858, 189 P.2d 976 (1948), where contrary language is used. Moloney
v. Moloney, 167 Kan. 444. 206 P.2d 1076 (1949), two girls, ages four and three. were
awarded to their mother.
00 Janney v. Janney, 159 Kan. 230. 154 P.2d 131 (1944).
•, Roll v. Roll, 143 Kan. 704, 56 P.2d 61 (1936); Note 48 A.L.R. 137 (1926). In In re
HI/dson, 13 Wash.2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942), the court refused to order a deformed
child taken from its parents and operated on against their will when the operation might
be fatal.
Il:I Dornsburg v. McKellar, 204 Ga. 189, 48 S.E.2d 820 (1948).
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detrimental to the children.63 These associations had frustrated the
mother's efforts in behalf of the children, given them inferiority com-
plexes, and caused them to do poorly at school. Alternating custody
between a parent and grandparents has been refused because it would
create friction and be detrimental to the welfare of the child.64 A
father's request for custody of his fifteen-year-old daughter was denied
because the girl was happy with her mother and it seemed to the court
unwarranted to transfer her from this home where she had been since
she was two years old.65
The outcome of a custody case can turn on where the child will
have the best home. A mother was ordered to return with her children
to a modern ten-room house in Hutchinson or lose custody of the
children. The house was provided by the father who was divorced
from the mother. She had moved from the Hutchinson home to Wich-
ita with her two children and was living in a small kitchenette apart-
ment.66 In another Kansas case, a child was sent to her grandmother
in England rather than be left in an institution in Kansas.67 Weight
has been given to the benefits a child would receive from being in the
same home with her sisters, in determining a custody case.68
In awarding custody, preferences expressed by the children as to
whom they wish to live with have been considered in some cases but
not in others. A test commonly applied is whether or not a child is
mature enough to make an intelilgent choice.69 In a recent Kansas
case, the court expressed a doubt as to whether this question of pref-
erence should ever be presented to children;70 and in another Kansas
.. Coats v. Coats, 161 Kan. 307, 167 P.2d 290 (1946).
"In re Windell, 152 Kan. 776, 107 P.2d 708 (1940). But c/., Travis v. Travis, 163 Kan. 54,
180 P.2d 310 (1947), alternating custody between the parents in six-month periods follow-
ing a divorce held not against the best interests of a four-year-old child.
"Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 147 Kan. 485,77 P.2d 946 (1938); accord, State v. Vorlicek, 229
Minn. 497, 40 N.W.2d 350 (1949).
"In re Hipple, 124 Kan. 3, 256 Pac. 1015 (1927).
tT In re Bullen, 28 Kan. 781 (1882) .
.. Holmes v. Coleman, 195 Ark. 196, III S.W. 2d 474 (1937) .
.. Chandler v. Whatley, 238 Ala. 206, 189 So. 751 (1939), seven-year-old child's preferences
ignored by the court; c/. Wooley v. Schaap, 234 Iowa 657, 12 N.W.2d 597, 602 (1944),
where the court said: "The child's preference is important when the contest for his custody
is between parents. It might be of some value when the contest is between a parent and
other relatives, such as grandparents. But it is not very persuasive when the contest is be-
tween a parent and one who stands in no blood relationship to the child.... eleven-year-old
boy awarded to his father against the child's wishes. State v. Vorlicek, 229 Minn. 497, 40
N.W.2d 350 (1949), eleven-year-old child's preference to live with aunt instead of father
considered; Smith v. Smith, 7 A.2d 829 (N.J. Ch.• 1939). sustained, 125 N.}.Eq. 384, 5 A.2d
774 (1939), ten·year·old boy's preference to remain with his grandmother rather than be
awarded to his mother considered.
111 Kogler v. Kogler, 163 Kan. 62, 179 P.2d 940 (1947).
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case the court treated the statement of a fourteen-year-old boy that he
wanted to stay with his grandparents as the expression of an "over-
indulgent youth."71
There are a surprisingly large number of cases involving the validity
of agreements in which parents have relinquished the custody of their
children to others. In these cases the parents have usually acted during
a crisis period: while the mother is fatally ill, just after the mother's
death, during great economic stress, immediately after the birth of a
child to an unmarried woman. When the crisis' passes, then one or both
parents want the child back. The Kansas court has uniformly held that
unless the agreement has been followed by a valid adoption, it is void,
or at least will not prevent the parents from reacquiring the child
when they wish to do SO.72 The reasons for this rule are that parents
cannot contract away their obligation to support their children;7S and
children are not a form of property, so may not be the subject matter
of gifts.74
To be consistent with the contract cases, testamentary efforts to
transfer custody of a child should not create legal custody or guardian
rights in the appointed person. But there is dictum in Kansas to the
contrary.7/l Also, in Kansas, a surviving parent may, by will, appoint
a guardian for his children.76
71 Andrews v. Landon, 134 Kan. 641, 7 P.2d 91 (1932).
72 In r~ Windell, 152 Kan. 776, 107 P.2d 708 (1940); Tucker v. Finnigan, 139 Kan. 496,
32 P.2d 211 (1934); Andrews v. Landon, 134 Kan. 641, 7 P.2d 91 (1932); In r~ Kailer,
123 Kan. 229, 255 Pac. 41 (1927); Jendell v. Dupree, 108 Kan. 460, 195 Pac. 861 (1921);
Tn r~ Meyer, 103 Kan. 671, 175 Pac. 975 (1918); Wood v. Shaw, 92 Kan. 70, 139 Pac. 1165
(1914); Pinney v. Sulzen, 91 Kan. 407, 137 Pac. 987 (1914).
'3 In r~ Windell, supra note 72; Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881).
"Tucker v. Finnegan, 139 Kan. 496,32 P.2d 211 (1934); and se~ Chapsky v. Wood, supra
note 73.
,. Delton v. James, 107 Kan. 729, 193 Pac. 307 (1920); but c/., Cook v. McCabe, 108 Kan.
172, 194 Pac. 633 (1921), and Tn r~ Meyer, 103 Kan. 671, 175 Pac. 975 (1918).
'R KAN. G. S. 1949, 59·1802.
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